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Allan C. Hutchinson ∗
“The Berle-Means corporation . . . is an adaptation, not a necessity.”
-- Mark Roe 1
The financial crisis over the last couple of years has exacted a heavy toll. Large corporations
have gone to the wall, banks have needed to be bailed out, and whole national economies have
collapsed. Amidst this mayhem, schemes of corporate governance have come under close
scrutiny. Punishing inquiries have been made about their role and performance in contributing
to or failing to avert the crisis. As allegations of greed, incompetence and irresponsibility by
corporate bigwigs have abounded, many have asked whether the structures and process of
corporate governance have been equal to their supposed task of shaping and controlling
corporate activities. Indeed, the debate about the validity of the whole approach to corporate
governance has become an organizational bell-weather in efforts to diagnose and remedy the
ills of the financial crisis.
In this essay, I want to make a distinctive contribution to that debate. On the basis that no
crisis should be wasted, I propose that substantial and substantive changes are required in
prevailing ways of thinking about and implementing corporate governance. Contrary to the
views of many commentators, I maintain that it is the whole nature of what counts as ‘good
corporate governance’ that must be re-thought and re-constructed from the conceptual ground
up. In order to inform and accomplish this goal, I will move beyond the traditional evaluative
focus of economic success and instead look to a more inclusive and democratic standard of
social well-being. Drawing upon an expansive understanding of the role of corporations in
modern society and its recent crises, it will suggest ways in which the performance of
corporations can be appreciated and assessed in terms of both economic and social
improvement. The essay is based upon and devoted to offering a re-visioning of Berle and
Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private Property.2
Although Berle and Means’ work was intended to redirect the governance of corporate affairs
away from furthering private cupidity and towards advancing public policy, their enslaving
insights have done more harm than good; they have tended to reinforce the primacy of private
∗

Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I am grateful to Cynthia
Hill, Ian Langlois, Michael Abdelkerim, Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Daved Muttart, Lisa Philipps, Poonam Puri, Paul Saguil,
Tony Vanduzer, John Cioffi and Peer Zumbansen for critical assistance and intellectual support.
1

MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE
286-87 (1994).

2

ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Rev. ed.
1968) (hereinafter all page references are in parenthesis in the text).
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cupidity or, perhaps more accurately, allowed subsequent theorists to prefer the pursuit of
private cupidity by equating it with the development of public policy. This is not only
unfortunate, but also unnecessary. Although Berle and Means’ The Modern Corporation forms
the bedrock of the prevailing paradigm in corporate law and governance, it also contains some
very suggestive materials from which to construct an alternative and more democratic way of
proceeding which actually subverts and transforms the established model. The remaining bulk
of this essay, seeks both to celebrate The Modern Corporation, but also to lament the enduring
influence of its received understanding on corporate law scholarship and practice. If Berle and
Means are to avoid becoming ‘defunct’ and remain relevant to contemporary ideas and
practice, it must be more as a conceptual corrective and less as a traditional prop for the
prevailing paradigm of corporate governance.

I. CRISIS AND GOVERNANCE
Somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be a general level of consensus about the primary
causes of the present crisis. Although there is considerable disagreement about the important
details of their precise dynamics and relative weighting, it is agreed that ‘short-termism’ and
‘executive self-interest’ played crucial and complementary roles in fuelling the excessive risktaking that was at the heart of the financial crisis. 3
First, management and boards became increasingly focused and, in some case, fixated on
inflating or maintaining a company’s share-price in the short term without genuine or little
concern for the long-term well-being of the company. Operating without sufficient capital
backing and relying on precarious lending, companies leveraged their limited assets without
adequate regard for (il)liquidity constraints. All this was compounded by the hands-off
monetary polices and lax regulatory practices of governments. This was most apparent and
devastating in the mortgage market which, ballooned up by a toxic mix of imprudent initiatives,
junk financing, predatory marketing, and regulatory indifference, exploded to devastating
effect.
Secondly (and in combination with ‘short-termism’), the executive officers of corporations
authorized and pursued enormously risk business projects in order to reap substantial profits,
ramp up the company’s short-term share-price, and earn large bonuses and enhanced
compensation for themselves. Although efforts to tie executive compensation to their
companies’ economic performance were originally intended to act as a both an incentive and
disciplinary device for management, it came to be revealed as a dangerous development that
encouraged executives to take very risky gambles which had short-term benefits, but exposed
3

For one of the most telling and accessible accounts of the crisis, see RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF
CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009). The fact that this book is by a former
‘capitalist promoter’ only adds to the book’s power and poignancy.
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companies to substantial mid- to long-term costs. 4 A smash-and-grab mentality began to take
hold; the underlying fundamentals of the corporate condition were given short shrift. As the
crisis vividly demonstrated, the apparently healthy state of the general economy and stockmarket in the first few years of the new century was revealed to be more the deceptive boom
before the inevitable bust than anything else.
The primary concern of this essay is not with the causes of the crisis as such, but with the role
that corporate governance played – did corporate governance fail? And, if so, what can be
done about it? Predictably, there is considerable disagreement. Some are not even persuaded
that the financial crisis can be attributed at all to the prevailing schemes and approaches to
corporate governance. For instance, Brian Cheffins insists that corporate governance
functioned “tolerably well” in the largest American companies.5 In a survey of the S & P top
500 companies, he claims to demonstrate that, in the 37 companies removed from the S&P list,
their schemes of corporate governance operated satisfactorily. Moreover, he contends that
over 70% the 15 companies with the worst-performing stocks in 2008 did not have staggered
boards, did not have a poison pill in place, and had majority voting or a director-resignation
policy. As such, Cheffins concludes that “the case in favor of dramatic reform [of current
corporate governance arrangements] has yet to be made out.” 6 He is still willing to place his
faith in the lightly-regulated disciplinary play of market-forces.
Although Cheffins’ survey and analysis are indeed cautionary, the conclusions that he draws are
over-stated and unreliable. Hr confirms the old adage that ‘if you ask the wrong question, then
you will get the wrong answer’. Leaving aside the fact that ‘market-forces’ did more to
facilitate the crisis than prevent it, there is simply too much taken for granted in his approach:
the enabling role of the blinkered and overriding directorial fiduciary duty to enhance
shareholder value is one villain of the legal piece. Asking if corporate governance was the or
even a ‘cause’ of crisis is plain silly. It is similar to asking if the lack of a safety device was the
cause of an accident. A much more sensible inquiry is whether corporate governance, like a
safety device, might have inhibited certain kinds of risky behavior or contained the calamitous
effects of certain eventualities. Looked at in this light, it recommends a more attentive
scrutiny of corporate governance’s capacity to check and channel the kind of short-term and
excessive risk-taking that precipitated the crisis. 7
The more general response to these crisis-contributing features of contemporary corporate
culture has been more positive and encouraging. Acknowledging that there has been “a
4

See, for example, LUCIAN BEBCHUK AND JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILELD PROMISE
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).

5

Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the
S&P 500, 65 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 1 at 50 (2009).
6
7

Id. at 51.

See The European Commission, Corporate Governance In Financial Institutions And Remuneration Policies In The
EU, (May 2010).
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widespread failure of corporate governance,” the American Congress has enacted a
Shareholder Bill of Rights Act which introduces measures to boost the long-term health and
stability of firms and their shareholders.8 These include more transparent compensation
practices, greater executive accountability, and enhanced risk-management. This has been
supplemented by further legislative initiatives which introduces tighter control over to
executive compensation by way of claw-backs and greater shareholder say-on-pay and which
mandates improved adviser independence and majority-voting for directors. 9 Of course, the
impact of these measures will depend on the willingness of Congress and the Administration to
enforce such requirements in a robust and consistent manner.
These legislative measures are nothing to be sniffed at. Most of these reforms are not
unimportant and might well have a salutary effect on the attitudes and actions of corporate
directors and executives. But they do not do nearly enough to address some of the deeper and
continuing sources of corporate misgovernance. They still manage to operate and acquire
validity within the traditional paradigm of corporate governance. Rather than simply place
checks and balances on existing boards or transfer increased power to shareholders, a more
root-and-branch re-structuring of the structures and dynamics of corporate governance is
needed. The size and consequences of the crisis demand a series of changes that are of the
same extent and impact. If there is to be any real progress in averting future crises and putting
corporate activity on a truly more stable footing, it will be necessary to go beyond the structural
tinkering that characterizes present reform efforts.
For example, a very recent study by David Erkensa, Mingyi Hunga, and Pedro Matosb points up
the inadequacy of measures to make boards more accountable to shareholders and to increase
the independence of boards. 10 Examining the performance of 296 financial firms from 30
countries that were at the center of the financial crisis, they reveal that that firms with more
independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during
the crisis period. They go on to suggest that the reasons for this are twofold -- because firms
with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which resulted in larger
shareholder losses during the crisis period, and because firms with more independent boards
raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing
shareholders to debt-holders. By way of conclusion, they cast doubt on whether regulatory
changes that increase shareholder activism and improve monitoring by outside directors will be
effective enough in reducing the consequences of future economic crises.

8
9

**
See, for example, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act **.

10

David Erkensa, Mingyi Hunga, and Pedro Matosb, Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis:
Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide (September 2010).
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Accordingly, I maintain that the recent crisis has underlined the urgency of attending to the
theoretical foundations of present and future practice. This is not only because of the scandals
and calamities which have occurred, but also because of the enacted reform’s relative failure to
address the deeper sources of the crisis which face corporate governance: the diagnosed
condition and the reputed cure are part of the same informing paradigm.11 Although
theoretical posturing is considered indulgent by the tough-minded sensibilities of the corporate
community (including, often, corporate law scholar), the current practice of corporate
governance is in thrall to a very partial cluster of conceptual premises: “practical men, who
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of
some defunct economist.” 12 The path-breaking work of Berle and Means lies at the heart of
this project: it is both part of the problem and part of the solution.

II. 1932 AND ALL THAT
The seventy-fifth anniversary of the publication of Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means’ The
Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932 passed without too much notice. This classic
work is universally acknowledged as one of law’s undisputed canonical texts. While it has aptly
been described as “arguably the most influential book in U.S. business history,” 13 its importance
is not merely as an historical curiosity: it has remained a mainstay of corporate law and
scholarship up to the present day. While its detailed analysis of corporate governance and the
particulars of its reform proposals have become less important over time, it still exerts
extensive conceptual influence. The fact that it is no longer referenced as frequently is less an
indication of its dated quality and more a testament to its foundational status. Indeed, it would
be no exaggeration to report that, as befits a book of its stature, The Modern Corporation
continues to provide the general intellectual framework within which much traditional thinking
about corporate governance in both law and business takes place: this is as true for the status
quo’s defenders as well as its detractors. It is clear, therefore, that any serious effort to
appreciate, let alone transform, the theory and practice of contemporary corporate governance
must pay close and critical attention to The Modern Corporation.

11

Some commentators, of course, maintain that those reforms went too far. See, for example, Roberta Romano,
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1522 at 1529 (2006).
12

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY ch.24 (1936). He
went on to conclude that “madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some
academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated
compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Sooner or later, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are
dangerous for good or evil.”
13

Peter Drucker, Reckoning with the Pension Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV. 106 at 114 (March/April 1991). In a
similar vein, it has been said that “no field of American law has ever been so totally dominated by one work as the
corporation law area by the Berle and Means classic.” Henry G. Manne, Intellectual Styles and the Evolution of
American Corporate Law in ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM: THE ECONOMIC APPROACH APPLIED OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF
ECONOMICS 219 at 223 (Gerard Radnitzky and Peter Bernholz eds. 1987).
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Although Berle and Means’ work had a prescient quality to it, The Modern Corporation was
very much a product of the 1920s. The first quarter of the Twentieth Century had witnessed a
massive and rapid surge in America’s capital economy. Along with this rise in economic
development and prosperity, there was a shift in production from small businesses to huge
conglomerates; the accumulation of vast fortunes and the concentration of corporate power in
elite hands were hallmarks of the period. However, culminating in the stock market crash of
1929 and the Great Depression, this era of unfettered capitalism was beginning to collapse
under its own burgeoning weight. By the late 1920s, the juggernaut of corporate organization
was being more closely scrutinized and its pervasive influence challenged. In what began as a
research project for the Social Science Research Council of America, Columbia law professor
Adolph A. Berle, Jr. sought out an economist with a statistical bent to work with so as to
produce a more empirical and technical understanding of corporate development: he was
paired up with Gardiner C. Means. Their unusual collaboration sought to appreciate the
corporation as a social institution as well as an economic organization. This huge undertaking
was projected to be “the work of a lifetime” and The Modern Corporation was to be the
opening volume “intended primarily to break ground on the relation which corporations bear to
property” (liii). 14 As such, it was meant to be the first and not the last word on the corporation
as a human institution.
Mean’s extensive mapping of the contemporary corporate terrain was novel and revealing. In
an examination of the 200 largest non-financial corporations in 1929, he found that in only 11%
of the firms did the largest owner hold a majority of the firm’s shares. Further, establishing
ownership of 20% of the stock as a threshold minimum for control, it was discovered that 44%
of those firms had no individual who owned that much of the stock. These 88 firms which were
classified as management-controlled also accounted for 58% of the total assets held among the
top 200 corporations. As analyzed by both Berle and Means, the upshot of these statistical
insights was that there were two significant and pressing features to be addressed -- the
growing concentration of power within a relatively small number of large corporations and the
increasing dispersal of stock ownership resulting in a widening gulf between share ownership
and executive control within those corporations. While each trend was important in itself, their
combination persuaded Berle and Means that a corporate revolution had occurred and that a
new frame of reference was required in order to appreciate it fully and deal with its legal and
social ramifications. However, although the fact of growing corporate power provided the
informing backdrop, the major thrust of their report was the struggle to come to terms with the
separation of ownership and control. Indeed, this characterization of the challenge became
“the master problem for research” in corporate law. 15 The growing concentration of corporate
14

For two very different approaches to the history of the modern corporation, see JOHN MICKLETHWAIT AND
ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003) and JOEL BAKAN,
THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER (2004).

15

Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923 at 923 (1984).
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power was more a contextual concern than a central problematic, presumably to be explored
more fully and directly in a later, but never realized volume.
In examining the organizational implications of the historical shift from family-owned firms to
large widely-held corporations in which there was separation of ownership and control, Berle
and Means continued, as they refined, a traditional view on corporate governance. They
insisted quite straightforwardly that corporations ought to be run by the management whose
powers were to be held in trust for stockholders as the sole beneficiaries of the corporate
enterprise. As the separation between share ownership and managerial control was becoming
increasingly wide, they worried about “the concentration of economic power” creating
“empires” which permit “a new form of absolutism” to be exercised by “the new princes” and
“economic autocrats” of controlling management (116). In an arresting phrase, they noted that
“a Machiavelli writing today would have very little interest in princes, and every interest in the
Standard Oil Company of Indiana.” 16 Indeed, they were so concerned about the power of
management that they compare the board of directors to “a communist committee of
commissars” and cast the director as someone who “more nearly resembles the communist on
mode of thought than he does the protagonist of private property” (245). In combating such
disturbing consequences of the shift in corporate holdings, Berle and Means maintained that
the primary role of corporate law was to ensure that “all powers granted to a corporation or
the management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation, ... are necessarily
and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders” (220). Because
it is the liquidity of their property which most concerns shareholders, not their involvement in
the corporation’s management, corporate law could rightly arrogate to itself the task of acting
as general overseers of management and subscribe to the commitment that “a corporation
should be run for the benefit of its owners, the stockholders” (293).
For Berle and Means, therefore, the task for corporate law was to work out how best to shape
corporate law so that it could respond effectively and efficiently to the intricate and operational
consequences of the divide between diffuse owners and self-serving managers. Put more
bluntly, their main focus was upon ensuring that managers do not ignore the absentee owners
and line their own pockets at the expense of the shareholders. Although retaining a continuing,
if partial, faith in the market as a means to discipline management and to protect shareholders’
expectations, they pinned their reform hopes on judicial intervention to discipline managers in
the name of shareholder confidence. With varying degrees of success, this was to be achieved
by mandating the primacy of shareholder voting in all-important corporate decisions and the
imposition of fiduciary duties on management (i.e., demanding that managers place the
corporation’s interests ahead of their own). In effect, they gambled on the willingness and
suitability of courts to fashion and police a series of strict and equitable obligations such that
“corporation law becomes in substance a branch of the law of trusts” (242).

16

A.A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, Corporations and the Public Investor, 20 AM. ECON. REV. 54 at 71 (1930).
For an excellent biographical account, see JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN
AMERICAN ERA (1987).
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However, it is Berle and Means’ framing of the ownership/control problem as the central
dynamic of corporate law and organization that is the main legacy of The Modern Corporation.
This remains the fundamental and taken-for-granted framework within which contemporary
thinking occurs. However, notwithstanding the almost universal acceptance in the ensuing 75
years of the accuracy of their diagnosis of the ills that afflict corporate governance, their
descriptive observations have not been matched by that of their prescriptive
recommendations. While their mode of proceeding has had some measure of, it has not
carried the day; they are something of “a policy relic.” 17 Its incorporation into corporate law
has been half-hearted at best and its capacity to restrain corporate malfeasance has clearly
been lacking in practical effect. More recently, commentators have turned to the market by
way of possible take-overs and performance-based compensation as further modes of
discipline such that inefficient managers would be replaced by profit-seeking shareholders.
In large part, the relative failure of Berle and Means’ reform proposals is because they could
not or would not move beyond the ‘private property’ logic of the traditional paradigm; profit
maximization and the protection of shareholders’ ownership entitlements were still the order
of the day. Their support for governmental and judicial intervention was premised on the
limiting premise that these official agencies would act as public surrogates for private
shareholders’ control. In anointing managers as the “princes of industry” (4) and
recommending that they must serve the community as a whole by ordering their affairs “on the
basis of public policy rather than private cupidity” (313), there was the distinct whiff of noblesse
oblige around even relatively liberal boardrooms in matters of corporate governance. Indeed,
with their the commitment to the idea that shareholders are ‘the owners of the corporation’,
Berle and Means offer a lament for the lost ‘active’ shareholder who is left with “a mere symbol
of ownership” (65). After all, the full title of their book is The Modern Corporation and Private
Property. For them, a private property regime provides the best incentive to ensure that
property is used efficiently in the sense that “the quest for profits will spur the owner of
industrial property to its effective use” (9). Accordingly, the central thrust of Berle and Means’
reform proposals was to close the gap between owners and management as much as the legal
imposition of equitable duties can do so as to emulate or approximate the ideal situation of
owner-managers. Theirs was a less of a break with the tradition of ‘shareholder primacy’ and
17

William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered At the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737 at 739 (2001). Berle
and Means’ concerns about the owners/managers divide was echoed by critics of the democratic process’s
operation more generally. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942) and
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, Introduction in ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES 15-39 (1962). However, not all
commentators saw the disjuncture as problematic, but viewed the greater dispersal of capital as a harbinger of
‘people’s capitalism’ and greater democracy. See Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation,
47 AM. ECON. REV. 311 (1957). See generally Mark Mizruchi, Berle and Means Revisited: the Governance and
Power of Large U.S. Corporations, 33 THEORY AND SOCIETY 579 (2004). For a very different account of corporate
history and politics, see Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1861 (2003). She notes that “by focusing on entrepreneurs and investors, they helped legitimize a
conception of value or wealth that was detached from work and labor.” Id. at 1868.
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more of a continuance of it. There may well have been a ‘corporate revolution’ by 1932, but
Berle and Means were far from revolutionary in their response.

III. CHRONICLE OF AN END FORETOLD
Much has changed since 1932 in the world of capitalist economies and corporate organization.
If the forces of ‘concentration’ and ‘separation’ were in play in Berle and Mean’s day, they have
been supplemented by others and become even more powerful and relentless today -institutional investors, take-overs and mergers, financial entrepreneurship, and the like. Yet, if
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman were to be believed, the first few years of the
Twentieth Century witnessed ‘the end of corporate history’. Echoing the apocalyptic
pronouncements of Francis Fukuyama from a decade earlier, they declaimed in 2001 that “the
basic law of corporate governance -- indeed, most of corporate law -- has achieved a high
degree of ... continuing convergence toward a single, standard model ... [and] there is no longer
any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase longterm shareholder value.” 18
But how wrong they were! The crisis of 2008 turned over a fresh page in corporate history. It
revealed that the ‘end of history’ thesis was little more than wishful thinking on the part of
Hansmann and Kraakman. Their reasoned analysis was leavened by ideological advocacy. At
best, it can be reported that the mainstream of corporate lawyers and commentators have
settled upon ‘shareholder primacy’ as the preferred normative goal. This is less because it has
achieved an objective and universal status, but more because few are prepared or have
sufficient incentive to resist the economic and political clout of those championing its
contemporary hegemony. It may well be a descriptive fact that “governance practice is largely
a matter of private ordering”, 19 but that does not mean that it should be accepted as a
18

Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). No
mention is made of Francis Fukuyama who (in)famously argued that the world had beaten a path to American
liberal democracy on the unfolding carpet of a Universal History whose woof and warp comprise the motifs of
political individualism and economic privatism. While it is incompletely implemented and capable of further
refinement, the ideal of liberal democracy marks the final end of History: “the modern liberal democratic world ...
is free of contradictions” and “at the end of history, there are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal
democracy.” F. FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 48 (1992). For a powerful critique of this
viewpoint, see J. DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: THE STATE OF THE DEBT, THE WORK OF MOURNING, AND THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL 56, 69 and 78 (P. Kamuf trans. 1994). Even Fukuyama himself has had serious second
thoughts about his original ‘end of history’ thesis. See AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND
THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE LEGACY (2006).
19

Id. at 455. For a more interesting spin on the ‘historical progress’ of corporate law scholarship, see Brain
Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63 CAMB. L.J. 456 (2004). While there are strong
pressures towards convergence, the history and political economy of comparative corporate governance strongly
suggests that there is no particular magic to any particular mode of corporate organization and structure.
Advanced economies have managed to develop and grow by reliance on a variety of systems of corporate
governance; there is no one size that fits all or, as importantly, no one size that necessarily fits best. See Ronald
Dore, William Lazonick, Mary O’Sullivan, Varieties of Capitalism in The Twentieth Century, 15 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POLICY 102 (1999).
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prescriptive recommendation. Yet, even in the few years since 2001, events in the corporate
world have not only confounded Hansmann and Kraakman’s optimism, but have highlighted
how fragile and defective the reliance on ‘shareholder primacy’ has become.
Despite these end-of-history prognostications, the fact remains that Berle and Means’ account
of the problem to be solved still informs most corporate law thinking. Almost all scholars and
commentators are still in the grip of a traditional mind-set in which the interests of
shareholders are paramount: ‘shareholder primacy’ remains the guiding light of corporate law
and scholarship. However, what has changed over the past 75 years is that there have been
varied and umpteen efforts to explain and rationalize this informing mandate so that it can
have the largest possible claim to normative legitimacy. Along with a continuing reliance on the
‘private property’ rationale, there are three other dominant arguments relied on by
contemporary theorists to explain and support the continued reliance on ‘shareholder primacy’
as the preferred rationale for corporate law and governance; they are ‘market discipline’,
‘social wealth’, and ‘shareholder democracy’. Each of them is deeply flawed and unconvincing;
there has been much heat, but little light.

A. PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
The defense of ‘shareholder primacy’ which runs most directly from Berle and Means’ ideas is
the claim that those who own the corporation are entitled to have the corporation operate in
their interests and receive any resulting profits. While this still has its supporters, it has lost
much of its argumentative appeal. 20 The ‘private property’ rationale misconstrues both the
particular import of owning shares in a corporation and the general consequences of property
ownership. While there can be little doubt that shareholders have property rights over shares
which can traditionally be treated as ownership, it does mean not that they, therefore, have
similar ownership rights over the corporation. For instance, the fact that I buy a lottery ticket
does not mean that I own part of the lottery corporation. While I do own the lottery ticket and
have certain traditional property rights which accompany that (e.g., to destroy it or give it to
someone else), it does not mean that my relation to the lottery corporation is one of owner.
While shareholders have various rights of ‘ownership’ (i.e., to sell stock, vote proxies, sue
directors, receive certain information, get residual pay-outs from corporation’s liquidation,
etc.), it is not convincing to assert that shareholders own the corporation in the same way that
20

See Symposium, Corporations and Private Property, 26 J. L. & ECON. 235 (1983). For a sampling of the theorists
who champion ‘shareholder primacy’, see Jonathon Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, (1991) 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 ;
Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Green, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Mark Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization,
(2001) U. PA. L. REV. 2063; W. Allen, J. Jacobs and L. Strine, The Great Takeover Debate : A Mediation on Bridging
the Conceptual Divide, (2002) 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 at 1075; and Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
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people own their cars or houses. Moreover, even if it is conceded that shareholders are to be
treated as ‘the owners of the corporation’, it by no means follows that they are entitled by
virtue of that status to have the corporation run entirely in their sole interests. Whatever
property ownership was originally considered to entail, the claims of property owners are no
longer thought to be or enforced as if they were unreserved and trumped all other competing
claims and interests: the rights of property owners are fundamental, but not absolute.21
The ‘private property’ argument tends to beg the very question which it is intended to answer.
In a democracy, private property has its important place, but it is not the foundational source of
all other rights and no longer, if it ever was, the right against which all other claims are to be
measured. Even when it comes to owning real property (e.g., a house or land) or personal
property (e.g., cars or books), there is no entitlement that the owners’ interests and desires will
always be given precedence over others’ interests; there are a whole host of codes, regulations,
rules and conventions which curtail the freedom and entitlements of owners. Indeed,
corporate law itself is chock full of examples which contradict the stark idea that shareholders
‘own’ the corporation -- shareholders can be restricted as to whom they sell their shares, how
they vote for management, when they must offer to buy others’ shares, etc. Furthermore, in
an economy of relatively diffuse shareholding, many shareholders are decidedly passive by
preference and have no interest in being involved in the management of the corporations in
which they invest; the self-image of the average investor is not one of corporate owner.
Accordingly, as in almost all other areas of law, therefore, corporate shareholding does not
comprise a black-and-white set of fixed entitlements, but is a very colorful, highly-shaded and
dynamic process. It is now accepted that property ownership is a matter of social calculation in
which individual interests are measured with and against other people’s interests. 22 As the
state creates and gives legal identity to corporations, it is for the state or the public to
determine who gets ownership over it and what that ownership entails. As such, the ownership
of a share will not convey any necessary rights on its owner nor will it necessarily amount to
ownership of the corporation from which the shares arise. As with all property ownership,
shareholding will consist of a bundle of rights whose content and extent will not be a natural
given, but will vary over time and across contexts.

B. MARKET DISCIPLINE
The most sweeping defense of ‘shareholder primacy’ comes from economics-inspired scholars.
The world of corporate governance is considered to be an informal institutional venue for selfinterested and motivated entrepreneurs to enter a series of consensual deals to advance their
21

S. BOWLES AND H. GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: PROPERTY, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS
OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT xi (1987). (It is entirely puzzling why “the rights of ownership prevail over the
rights of democratic citizenry in determining who is to manage the affairs of a business enterprise whose policies
might directly affect as many as half a million employees, and whose choice of product, location, and technology
touches entire communities and beyond.”)
22

J. Waldron, Property Law in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 7 (D. Patterson ed.
1999) and THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY (1986).
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own private economic interests. Although the market is far from being ideal or even optimal in
its operations, it is touted as the preferred or least-worst alternative through which to coordinate productive endeavors and meet the mixed needs of its participants. From such a
standpoint, the public regulation of corporate governance is considered to be merely facilitative
rather than directive. Corporate actors are to be left to exercise their private discretion in
determining what is best for particular corporations and, by virtue of that, the public interest:
the market will fill the gaps and exact a penalty on the deviant few who engage in dubious
activities and unreasonable practices. 23 This competitive market behavior is supposed to solve
the separation of ownership and control by a variety of disciplinary devices -- minimizing
agency costs (i.e., keeping managers in line with shareholder interests), containing the everpresent threat of take-overs, responding to competition among firms for successful managers,
monitoring share prices in the stock market, etc. Corporate law clearly favors the interests of
shareholders over others because shareholders are more vulnerable as they are less able to
find alternative outlets in the market for their services; they risk all their equity in the
corporation’s ventures and therefore are entitled to greater protection by being beneficiaries of
the directors’ fiduciary duty over the fate of the corporation.
However, the confidence placed in the capacity of market forces to fulfill these onerous
responsibilities seems extravagant and entirely suspect. The ‘great tragedy’ of economics, like
so many other academic disciplines, is that it is one more beautiful theory brought to its knees
by ugly facts -- it is reductionist in its insistence in viewing all social conduct in terms of market
behavior; it manages, by giving everything a monetary value, to overvalue and undervalue
much of human interaction; its leading concepts (voluntariness, transaction costs, etc.) are
theoretically vague and practically indeterminate; it is ethically bankrupt in that it takes all
personal preferences at face value and refuses to distinguish among them; it is self-serving in
that it treats all personal preferences as independent of the social or market system in which
they are generated and satisfied; it ignores the distinction between willingness to pay and
ability to pay; and it celebrates individual autonomy over communal attachment. 24
Any plausibility that the market can operate as a disciplinary technique through which to
advance the larger public good is confounded by the sheer size and influence of today’s
corporations. These massive institutions begin to serve their own interests at the expense of
everyone else’s and distort rather than personify the entrepreneurial spirit of a market
economy. Even Berle and Means accepted this, although they were not prepared to act fully

23

F. EASTERBROOK AND D. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC OF CORPORATE LAW 34 (1991). The ‘nexus of contracts’ idea
is attributable to M. Jensen and W. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
24

Robert Ashford, The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law and Corporate Social Responsibility, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1187 at 1198 (2002).
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upon it. 25 Accordingly, although many scholars preach the gospel of free markets, the cruel
irony is that corporations are one of the greatest threat to the operation of free markets;
competition is attenuated and limited to a few large players. As such, corporations have
become super-citizens with enormous powers and influence that rival those of the state and
the latter-day church, but with much less popular legitimacy and social accountability. Rather
than be the justificatory underwriter of corporate institutions and enterprise, the validating
operation of today’s market is effectively hobbled by the continuing involvement of today’s
mega-corporations.

C. SOCIAL BENEFIT
A third justification for ‘shareholder primacy’ is that it is the best way to ensure that corporate
operations and profits work to the benefit of everyone in society: it is a ‘on a rising tide, all
boats will rise’ defense. Although it might appear paradoxical, it is argued that, even though “
interests of shareholders deserve no greater weight in this social calculus than do the interests
of any other members of society, there is “as a consequence of both logic and experience, ...
convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end ... is to make corporate managers
strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those
interests.” 26 In short, it is contended that such that the more wealth generated in a society, the
better off or more satisfied the whole of society will be. By holding corporate powers in trust
for shareholders, it will be the same as holding corporate powers in trust for the entire
community: any efforts (and this is proportionately true for the efforts of corporations) which
contribute to the increased wealth of a society are to be applauded. In short, maximizing
profits and increasing share prices will not only benefit everyone, but corporate profit-making
and social service, far from being at odds with each other, can be understood as mutuallyreinforcing aspects of the same enterprise.
Despite its ingenious nature, this ‘rising tide’ defense of the desirability of prioritizing the
pursuit of corporate profits in the social scheme of things is as unconvincing on second look as
it is on first glance: it is unsupported by ‘logic’ and no evidence of ‘experience’ is offered. There
is surely no reason to accept at face value that, if a corporation declares profits of $1 million,
social wealth is increased whether that profit is all distributed to one person, shared among the
shareholders at large, spread among the various stakeholders, or distributed evenly among
society. Economic growth will not in itself ensure that a society’s economic health, let alone its
broader democratic or social health, is rude or improving. Indeed, many small boats are sinking
or capsizing in this economic flow; their ability to stay afloat, let alone make progress, might
well be in real danger. Accordingly, while a society’s overall economic growth is important and
telling, it is not the sole or most important indicator of a society’s general condition and
improvement. That being the case, there is no self-evident reason to accept that an increase in
its Gross Domestic Product is, without more, a consistent or convincing indication that a society
25

See infra at pp.**.

26

Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, supra, note 18 at 440.
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is better off.27 Indeed, an increasing GDP may actually exacerbate social divisions. While an
increase might usually be better than a decrease, the circumstances of the increase or decrease
and the distribution of those gains or losses will need to be measured against a broader and
less exclusively economic standard. If some smaller or less sturdy boats sink before the
increasing tide, then that is the price of progress. But this response seems crass, at best,
because it is difficult to take satisfaction in society’s overall increased wealth if there are still
people who live in relative poverty and destitution.

D. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY
The final rationale for ‘shareholder primacy’ is that it actually facilitates the achievement of
democratic control over corporate activities and governance. The basic assertion is that,
whatever the historical record suggests, the present distribution of shareholding is so diffuse
and extensive that large corporations are actually controlled by society at large: more
Americans own stock today than ever before. After all, the United States has one of the most
widely-held corporate economies in the world with only about 20% of corporations being
owned or controlled by a single shareholder.28 This developing trend is considered to have
been reinforced by the increasing role of institutional shareholders, like mutual funds and
pension funds, which enable ordinary investors to participate in corporate affairs and exert
their aggregated influence in a more effective manner. Indeed, some have commentators have
gone so far as to suggest that plutocratic rule is at an end and that the age of “pension fund
socialism’ is now upon us. 29
However, while these claims have some statistical credibility, their deeper significance is
exaggerated. First, although more Americans hold more stocks than ever before, their
distribution is heavily skewed -- the bottom three-quarters of households own less than 15% of
all stock, barely one-third hold more than $ 5,000 in stock, and almost a half own no stock at
all. 30 This is very soft ground on which to support the claim that ‘shareholder democracy’ is
27

BRANKO MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2005). For
instance, the financial wealth of the top one percent of US households exceeds the combined wealth of the
bottom 95 percent. See J. GATES, DEMOCRACY AT RISK: RESCUING MAIN STREET FROM WALL STREET – A
POPULIST VISION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000).

28

See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54
J. FIN. 471 (1999).
29

PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: HOW PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA (1976). Of
course, this turn of events is not greeted with glee by all. The major rationale for an increased and active voice by
institutional investors is that it will “increase corporate efficiency and value.” Bernard Black, Agents Watching
Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 at 887 (1992).
30

David Callahan, The Myth of the Populist Stock Market (January 8, 2004) CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR. Most
Americans have more debt on their credit cards than money in their mutual funds. Between 1989 and 1997, 86%
of stock market gains went to just the top 10% of households. these figures reflect the deeper inequality which
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alive and well. Not only does the unequal distribution of share-ownership fatally impair such
claims, but the fact that most of these investors remain passive does little to bolster the claim.
Indeed, the incidence of institutional investment has actually exacerbated the divide between
ownership and control. Even greater power is concentrated in a small cadre of investing
professionals who have enormous control over the market and seem intent on exercising it in
order to aligning themselves closer to management so as to obtain further business and
advance their own interests. For instance, a recent study reveals that mutual funds have a
definite tendency to back executive-pay proposals and to oppose shareholder attempts to rein
in such excesses: mutual funds support executive plans over shareholder opposition in almost 3
out of 4 instances.31 Accordingly, while ensuring a more robust check on corporate
management’s self-serving tendencies is not unimportant, it does not address the broader
concerns of corporate governance in a democratic society. Not surprisingly, the advancement
of private interests has been the primary goal of institutional investors; the public interest has
taken a distinct second place or has been reduced to much the same as the aggregate
maximization of private interest. There is, at best, a faux-democracy at work in contemporary
corporate governance.

IV. TOWARDS A NEW AGE
If there is to be an end to corporate history, it is not the one that Hansmann and Kraakman
reported or predicted. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, the first decade of the Twenty-First
Century is not the end of corporate history, but it might well be the beginning of the end of one
phase of corporate history and the beginning of another.32 Although we have entered the third
millennium, society’s most important and influential institution remains decidedly Victorian, if
not occasionally feudal, in its orientation and organization. A small and unrepresentative elite
pervades American society. In 2002, it was estimated that the United States’ Gini coefficient (a measure of relative
income inequality) to be 0.394. Thus, income inequality in the United States is higher than in France (0.326),
Belgium (0.246), Italy ( 0.306), Portugal (0.348), Greece (0.320), the Netherlands (0.311), Norway (0.247), Canada
(0.310), Switzerland (0.324), the UK (0.354) and Australia (0.354), to name a few. Branko Milanovick and Shlomo
Yitzhaki, Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?, 48 REVIEW OF INCOME
AND WEALTH 155 (2002). Also, between 1979 and 1989, the top 1% doubled its wealth from 22% to 39 % of the
overall wealth and had captured 70% of all earnings growth since the mid-1970s. See KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH
AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RICH (2002).
31

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO and The Corporate Library, Enablers of
Excess: Mutual Funds and The Overpaid American CEO (March 2006).
32

Winston Churchill, Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Luncheon, Mansion House, London, November 10, 1942 (“This is
not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”). For a sampling
of the theorists who reject ‘shareholder primacy’, see Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing
Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409 (1993); PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed. 1995); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, [1990] DUKE L.J. 201; Lyman Johnson,
The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, (1990) 68 TEXAS L. REVIEW 865; W.
Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy : A Proposed Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder
Interests, (1997) 30 COL. J. OF LAW AND SOC. PROBS. 589; and G. Crespi, Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Duties:
The Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy Norm, (2002) 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 141.
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of controlling shareholders, directors and management effect a command-and-control regimen
over the lives and fates of countless people. Yet, there are now some encouraging indications
that there is a nascent shift in public opinion and forbearance. Not only are people beginning
to lose patience with corporations, but there are also some emerging efforts to rein in their
power. It is important to seize this moment of institutional disaffection and turn it to greater
democratic and transformative effect. If there is a crisis, it is as much one of political will as it
is of normative decrepitude. As the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci put it, “the crisis
consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this
interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appears.” 33 Indeed, the past few years have
witnessed ‘a great variety of morbid symptoms’ in regard to corporate governance.
The Enron saga and particularly the institutional response to it are probably most illustrative of
this pathological condition. Indeed, the beleaguered company’s accounting scandals and the
legislative response by way of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) are both decidedly
derivative of and trapped within the paradigm of shareholder primacy; they present an
indictment of the whole conceptual basis for corporate governance. As a reasonably stern
response to shaken investor confidence in financial performance, SOX contains a series of
measures intended to enhance corporate responsibility, improve financial disclosure and
combat corporate and accounting fraud. To ensure more reliable processes of control,
disclosure and auditing of financial results, rules are directed to improving the efficiency of
audit committees, the independence of outside auditors, the implementation of internal
procedures, and the like. In particular, senior executives of large publicly-traded corporations
are required to validate the legitimacy of their performance reports by signing-off on them.
Most of these measures are mandatory in nature and impose monetary and criminal penalties
for violations, although the provisions about adopting a code of ethics for the CEO and senior
financial officers only require that corporations disclose whether or not they have such codes
and, if not, why not. From within the shareholder-centred traditional paradigm, SOX is a
relatively robust initiative and, as long as its rigorously enforced, will have some important and
beneficial effects.
Yet, while the legislative reforms might or might not improve auditing and budgetary controls,
there was a singular failure on the part of regulators to appreciate that it was the single-minded
focus on maximizing shareholder-value that was at the heart of the problem. The Act is
premised on the idea that the whole Enron debacle was attributable to management’s conflicts
of interest which resulted from a lack of supervision by the board of directors. 34 Consequently,
33
34

A. GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 210 (Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith eds. 1971).

Berle and Means’ The Modern Corporation made no real distinction between board and management (196) and,
therefore, paid little attention to the power struggle within management to control the firm. Nor did they pay
much attention to the existence and impact of inter-locking directorships and integrated corporate networks. As
the scandals at Enron and other companies show, the board’s ability and appetite to monitor management is
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the remedy was to be found in ensuring that executive behavior was brought back into line
with and disciplined by greater solicitude for the interests of shareholders through a more
independent board of directors and external auditors. However, there is ample evidence that it
was the single-minded and irresponsible efforts by the management and board to inflate and
maintain share prices and stock values that fueled the corporation’s demise. A continuing
attachment to shareholder primacy was as much the problem as the solution. 35 Until that
underlying commitment is confronted and met, there will be little progress in moving forward
and avoiding further Enron-like debacles. While it might be going too far to suggest that
traditional models of corporate governance are priming large corporations to become accidents
waiting to happen, it is entirely appropriate to recommend that there will be little progress in
combating Enron-like failures until there is a shift away from the shareholder-primacy ideology
which continues to dominate the theory and practice of corporate governance.
Accordingly, after a run of over 150 years, the basic model for corporate regulation is in need of
serious revision. The maladies that afflict corporate governance are no longer capable of being
fixed by strong doses of reformist medicine. The time has come to effect a complete rethinking of our fundamental theories about and expectations of corporations in modern
Canadian society. As in mid-Nineteenth Century England, it is now imperative to bring about a
massive transformation in the structure, organization and outlook of large corporations. Up to
the 1860s, there was the First Age of corporations in which they began life as state-sponsored
enterprises to support the schemes and ambitions of fledgling nation-states in commerce and
colonization. Between the 1860s and today, there has been the Second Age of corporations as
private-controlled agencies for wealth accumulation and technological innovation. Giving birth
to robber-barons, corporate raiders and dot.com billionaires, private corporations have become
more global and only a little less exploitative in their operations as the state-directed agencies
of old. There is now the need and, as importantly, the possibility for the emergence of a new
paradigm for the corporation. The move away from a private conception of corporate life to a
more public vision of corporations need most decidedly not be a misconceived return to the
pre-1860 understanding of corporations as delegated centres of state power. The new age of
corporations must be one in which these vital organizations are treated as vibrant and
democracy-enhancing vehicles for public and private benefit. Within such a newly-emerging
sensibility and milieu, the power and prestige of corporations can be harnessed to the
realization of a more democratic society generally. Indeed, precisely because corporations are
so pervasive and so potent in their impact on most people’s daily lives, they offer a vital site at
which to begin this paradigmatic overhaul. And the neglected sub-theme of Berle and Means’
Modern Corporation is an excellent place to begin that important endeavor.

suspect at best. For a recent comparative analysis of corporate networks, see PAUL WINDOLF, CORPORATE
NETWORKS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2002).
35

See Simon Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann, Learning From Enron, 12 CORP. GOV. 134 (2004). For a very
different take on SOX, see Roberto Romano, supra, note 11.
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It seems to be the fate of almost all canonical texts that they not only become more cited than
read, but that they are affixed with one received and uncontroversial meaning. Berle and
Means’ classic monograph is wonderful proof of that tendency. If the great bulk of secondary
literature is to be believed, The Modern Corporation comprises a series of secondary motifs
around a primary theme -- the need to bridge the gap between owners and management as
much as the legal imposition of equitable duties can do so as to approximate the ideal situation
of owner-managers. Yet, because a particular text has been accepted into the legal canon does
not mean that the light it casts is clear or certain. Indeed, as with texts that have received
canonical status in literature or precedents as part of the doctrinal canon, the meaning and
instruction of legal texts often remain much richer and more contested than appreciated or
conceded; they do not speak for themselves, but their re-reading is an occasion for valorized
efforts at hermeneutical retrieval. For some, in law and literature, this richness and opacity are
some of the qualities that recommend a text as great. In this sense, Shakespeare’s Hamlet and
the Supreme Court’s Roe are great not only because of their profundity, but also because of
their profligacy. 36 They have stood the test of time because of their richness and contestability,
not in spite of them. Sadly, Berle and Means’ Modern Corporation has suffered a more
orthodox fate.

A. A RE-VISION
Nevertheless, The Modern Corporation is not so easily pigeon-holed and lends itself to
convincing and suggestive alternative readings. Although it has been appropriated by
mainstream corporate law academics to invoke the ‘separation of ownership and control’ thesis
to advocate stronger shareholder rights, the text’s “analysis was a gun on a rotating platform
that could be pointed in more than one direction.” 37 Indeed, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property is a profoundly challenging, yet schizophrenic book. It is, in large and
traditionally-understood part, a nostalgic lament for a lost and traditional age of simple
economic arrangements; this rendering has become the mainstream legacy of Berle and
Means. But, in smaller and neglected part, it is also a romantic yearning for a new and
revolutionary vision of social organization. Once it is appreciated that “[s]ize alone tends to
give these giant corporations a social significance not attached to the smaller units of private
enterprise,” it is not so large a step to conclude that “new responsibilities towards the owners,
the workers, the consumers, and the State thus rest upon the shoulders of those in control” (7).

36

See ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, IT’S ALL IN THE GAME: A NON-FOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF LAW AND
ADJUDICATION 86-115 (2000).
37

J.A.C. Hetherington, Redefining the Task of Corporation Law, 19 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 229 at 235 (1985).
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This alternative and more capacious reading comes alive when Berle and Means’ concern with
the rise of the corporation as organizations which have “passed far beyond the realm of private
enterprise ... [and] have become more nearly social institutions” (46) is placed front and centre
ahead of the ownership-and-control thesis. Indeed, in 1932, they felt able to conclude The
Modern Corporation with a chilling appraisal of American corporate power. They opined that
not only did corporations represent “a concentration of economic power which can compete on
equal terms with the modern state,” but also that “the modern corporation may be regarded
not simply as one form of social organization, but potentially (if not yet actually) as the
dominant institution of the modern world, ... possibly even superseding [the state]” (313). If
that day of ‘actually’ has not yet arrived today, it is perilously closer; the march of corporate
power has continued apace. In order to appreciate fully the extent to which corporations have
consolidated and increased their economic sway, it is necessary to place their operations and
performance in a wider global context. When this is done, the almost unrivaled dominance of
these “non-statist collectivisms” 38 in social and political as well as economic spheres can be
grasped.
If corporate sales and national GDPs are treated as inter-changeable, corporations comprise
about 50% of the world’s 100 largest economies in the world. Of course, American
corporations dominate the global group, with 82 representatives or 41% in the of top 200:
Japanese firms are second, with only 41 slots. So, General Motors is now bigger than Denmark;
Daimler-Chrysler is bigger than Poland; Royal Dutch/Shell is bigger than Venezuela; IBM is
bigger than Singapore; and Sony is bigger than Pakistan. Indeed, the top 200 corporations’
combined sales are bigger than the combined economies of all countries, except for the biggest
10. Also, the top 200 corporations’ sales are growing at a faster rate than overall global
economic activity. However, while the sales of the top 200 corporations are the equivalent of
27.5% of world economic activity, they employ only 0.78% of the world’s workforce.
Furthermore, although the those corporations’ profits grew 362.4% in the past 20 years or so,
the number of people that they employ increases by only 14.4%. The economic clout of the top
200 corporations is particularly staggering compared to that of the poorest segment of the
world’s humanity: their combined sales are 18 times the combined annual income of the 1.2
billion people or 24% of the world’s total population living in ‘severe’ poverty (those surviving
on less than $1 per day). 39
Once what Louis Brandeis termed the “curse of bigness” is placed in contemporary context,40
the concerns of Berle and Means become even more compelling. They appreciated that,
38

Berle, Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY xvi (E. Mason ed. 1959).
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because “the economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a giant corporation
is a tremendous force which can harm or benefit a multitude of individuals, affect whole
districts, shift the currents of trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another,”
(46) the people who exercised power over these burgeoning corporate empires would become
the new “princes of industry” (4) and a new despotism would take hold. As such, it was
essential that this enormous power “shall be subjected to the same tests of public benefit
which have been applied in their turn to power otherwise located” (310) in modern society. In
short, therefore, if ‘accountability’ is seen as the primary theme of the book, its concerns and
proposals for change take on a very different emphasis and orientation. The private property
owners became as much a part of the problem as the solution; their powers and entitlements
must be harnessed to and disciplined in accordance with the public interest. When read in this
way (and almost despite the efforts of the authors themselves), The Modern Corporation
remains a robust and still relevant critique of corporate governance at the beginning of the
Twenty-First Century. More importantly, it still resonates strongly as a rallying call to popularist
arms for all those who are committed to making the large modern corporation a worthy and
welcome participant in the all-important project for democratic empowerment.

B. SECOND THOUGHTS?
In many ways, it was Berle and Means’ own ambivalence about pursuing the more radical
implications of their critique which hindered efforts to move away from a ‘private property’
regime to a more fully public re-envisioning of the corporate role and responsibility. At the end
of their celebrated monograph, they begin to build on the established fact that the modern-day
shareholder has clearly “surrendered a set of definite rights for a set of indefinite expectations”
(244). Indeed, they go so far as to concede that, with the entrenched separation of ownership
and control, the shareholders’ “relation to [their] wealth” has changed and that the corporation
should be seen as a public entity and “the logic applicable to that change should itself change”
(298). Yet Berle and Means refused to take the next ‘logical’ step which was not only to accept
the passivity of shareholders, but also to recognize that the very idea of the shareholder as
property owner was no longer valid or applicable and that reliance on a ‘private property’
rationale for corporate governance was no longer compelling or desirable.
Even on its publication in 1932, The Modern Corporation’s focus on the importance of the
disjuncture between ownership and control did not persuade everyone. Dissenting voices
could be heard, although their force and caution have long since been ignored. In particular, E.
Merrick Dodd Jr. argued that corporate directors and officers should not be viewed solely as
agents of shareholders, but should also be required to act as stewards for the interests of
others, even if that meant curtailing the proprietary rights of those shareholders. Indeed,
Edwin Dodd went so far as to suggest that managers might go further and actually consider
themselves to be “guardians of all the interests which the corporation affects and not merely
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servants of its absentee owners.” 41 Berle took up the challenge and responded to Dodd by
arguing that a broad corporate duty to serve society not only would violate shareholders’
private property rights, but would also be so vague as to put no meaningful constraint on
managers’ use of corporate assets: “unchecked by present legal balances, a social-economic
absolutism of corporate administrators, even if benevolent, might be unsafe.” 42 However, by
the late 1950s, a chastened Berle seemed to have at least conceded considerable ground in his
debate with Dodd. While he recognized that managerial discretion might be viewed as a
positive attribute which could allow managers to act in the interests of society as a whole, 43
Professor Berle insisted that he did not accept that Dodd was right in any absolute or
prescriptive sense: “it is one thing to agree that this is how social fact and judicial decisions
turned out [but,] ... it is another to admit this was the ‘right’ disposition; I am not convinced it
was.” 44
By 1968, in their new and separate prefaces for The Modern Corporation, Berle and Means had
begun to accept many of the limitations in the thinking that underlay the original edition.
Nevertheless, they were still not fully prepared to abandon their established ways of thinking.
After describing the even greater level of concentration and lack of genuine competition among
American corporations, the economist Means contented himself with simply asking “is the
concentration of power in the management of the large corporations consistent with the
maintenance of a democratic society?” (l). On the other hand, the law professor Berle stated
that, while the nature of the property rights of shareholders has changed, there is still very
much a property right at work. Although “a new classification has been superimposed on the
old theory” (xxiii) and “the ‘private’ and, still more, individualized, aspects [of property] will
become increasingly attenuated” (xxvi), there has now been a break-up of “the package of
rights and privileges comprising the old conception of property” (xxxi). Nevertheless, Berle
came back to the conclusion that , even though there has been a move away from treating
stock as primarily a vehicle for raising capital and more “a channel for distributing income
whose accumulation for capital purposes is not required” (xxix), the modern corporation and
“property used in production [i.e., shares] must conform to conceptions of civilization worked
out through democratic process of American constitutional government” (xxxviii). He was
convinced that the era of private corporations (or, at least, the understanding of corporations
as extensions of private share-holding) was no longer coherent in practice or theory.
However, the time has come to take the obvious steps that Berle and Means illuminated, but
felt unable or unwilling to pursue themselves. In a compelling conclusion to The Modern
Corporation, they floated the idea of rejecting both a strengthening of the rights of passive
investors and a realpolitik acceptance of managerial control. Instead, they offered the
41
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possibility that, because existing corporate arrangements had “cleared the way for the claims of
a group far wider than either the owners or the control [group],” the community could
“demand that the modern corporation serve not [only] the owners or the control [group] but all
society and that the governing principle of corporate governance should be “the paramount
interests of the community” (312). Indeed, Berle and Means end with a hope that the
separation between ownership and control will result not in a triumph by one faction over the
other, but with the rise of a new paradigm of corporate governance; “the law of corporations
might well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new economic state.” (313).
While they were wrong in believing that the control of corporations and the balancing of
interests might be effected by “a purely neutral technocracy”, they were on the right track
when they expressed the hope that this might be done “on the basis of public policy rather than
private cupidity” (312-13). The challenge, therefore, is to move from ‘private cupidity’ to
‘public policy’ while both retaining the best of private initiative and resisting the worst of a
domineering state. This can be achieved by ushering in a new era of corporate history in which
democracy is the standard and the goal of corporate governance. In such a vision, corporations
might begin to function as a democratic nexus at which public and private, political and
economic, individual and state, and personal freedom and civic responsibility meet.
Corporations will be less an anomaly in contemporary democratic terms and more a primary
site for the advancement of democratic politics.
Before proceeding to sketch this democratic alternative, two preliminary caveats are worth
mentioning. As critical as I am of the narrow scope and shallow substance of the existing model
of corporate governance, none of my critique should be interpreted as trashing or rejecting
those legal rules and doctrines which seek to control management in the name of some larger
set of interests: no other group gains when managers self-deal. However, in supporting such
disciplinary laws, it does not follow that the effort to discipline management should be done
only on behalf of shareholders. From a more democratic perspective, profit maximization will
not be eschewed entirely, but will simply no longer be the exclusive or pre-dominant goal
among many other social ambitions -- shareholders will be one kind of constituency member.
Moreover, in recommending a shift away from the present paradigm, I am not suggesting that
the whole idea of ‘private property’ should be abandoned or, as some might propose, that the
‘means of production’ be put in public hands. I am as much against an overbearing state as a
rampant private sphere. It is more that democracy should be used as a theory and a practice to
address the economic and social conditions of people’s lives as much as their civil and political
entitlements; the market must be made to serve, not control people’s interests. In that, Milton
Friedman is right in one important regard -- the effort to extend the range of institutions and
interests to which corporations owe obligations is a “fundamentally subversive doctrine.” 45
However, while this effort might signal the end of the prevailing governance arrangements, it
might also be the harbinger of a more democratic society.
45
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In seeking to nurture and develop suitable forums and settings that are more local and less
hierarchical and are more participatory and less private, large corporations recommend
themselves as almost ideal locations for enabling people to become full citizens in their society.
They stand squarely between the market and the government and they exert the kind of power
which needs to be opened up if there is to be any real progress in closing the democratic gap
between the governors and governed. Of course, such a political enterprise will demand that
several crucial relations and contexts be transformed and reworked -- those between
corporations and the state; those inside corporations (i.e., shareholders, management and
workers); and those between corporations and general public. Nevertheless, it is only if such a
bold strategy to advance the democratic project is commenced that any real or meaningful
change in the democratic condition generally and in corporate governance particularly can be
expected. There are risks attached to such a commitment, but there are greater dangers to
maintaining the status quo.

A. A DEMOCRATIC GAMBIT
In the quarter century since Lindblom’s conclusion that “the large corporation [does not fit] into
democratic theory and vision”,46 the situation has hardly improved. Although the power and
influence of corporate activities has continued to expand and deepen, a democratically-inspired
agenda for corporate governance has lost much of the plot. Reform efforts remain too
reactive, too piecemeal, too modest, and too trapped within the prevailing paradigm. In
contrast, I want to offer, in the spirit of a reworked Berle and Means’ approach, an unabashedly
and robust democratic proposal for corporate law and governance. By understanding
corporations as neither wholly public nor wholly private institutions, the hope is to move
beyond the cramped language of the public/private and harness the traditional strengths of the
corporate form to the more civic agenda of democracy. By envisaging and concretizing a
democratic form of corporate organization, it might become possible to cultivate the kind of
hybrid institution for civic interaction, both economic and political, which will be true to the
democratic ambitions of all its participants.
Despite all the recent and high-profile shenanigans of bad corporate behavior, it would be
mistaken to place all the critical focus on them. If any actual progress is to be made in
confronting and improving corporate wrongdoing, it demands more than an ethical and
criminal condemnation of such individual conduct. As important as that is, identifying and
punishing corrupt or greedy executives whose conduct is castigated by almost everyone both
outside and inside the corporate world is almost the easy part. What is much more difficult and
necessary is to address the larger organizational structures and culture within which such
roguery arises and persists. It is what presently passes as ‘good corporate governance’ that is
as much of a problem as the instances of bad corporate behavior. It might be that, when
46
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corporate managers are doing their job best or, at least, well, they are doing most harm to
society. This perverse state of affairs demands urgent appraisal. It is only when large
corporations are understood and analyzed in the larger setting of democracy that it will be
possible to move forward. Indeed, it is only when corporations are obliged to become part of,
rather remain apart from, democratic society more broadly that progress will be made. If we
want ‘good corporate citizens’, then we must seek a sea-change in how we think about
corporations, how we constitute them, how we regulate them, and what we expect of them.
To ignore or marginalize such issues is to renege on the most basic of democratic ambitions.
The fact that large corporations are major players in the political, economic and social system
seems to be indisputable; they exercise enormous power over the lives of ordinary people.
While any accumulation of power must be treated with suspicion and mistrust in a democracy,
there is no necessity to consider it illegitimate by its aggregation fact alone. Power is not the
problem in and of itself, but the basis for its exercise and legitimacy. When it comes to the
pedigree and consequences of corporate power, there is a considerable burden on its
operatives and apologists to offer a suitable series of justifications; corporate power seems
presumptively undemocratic, if not actually anti-democratic. Because the goal of shareholder
primacy has become “second nature to politicians,” 47 it will be necessary to offer a pragmatic
alternative to the neo-liberal philosophy which has proven so effective in insulating large
corporations from regulation and regeneration in the public interest. As the line between
government and business has become increasingly blurred, politicians are persuaded that
government’s only legitimate role is to facilitate business. As one critic pointedly notes, “while
the business of government seems more than ever to be business, the business of business ...
[is] increasingly becoming that of government.” 48
Despite its many different and innovative efforts, traditional theorizing has failed to make a
persuasive case for how the modern corporation can be reconciled with the rhetoric and reality
of democratic governance in contemporary society. In particular, a major source of
bewitchment in this process is the conceptual tendency to insist that there is an almost castiron distinction between public undertakings and private interests. Whereas the former are
considered to be the legitimate domain for democratic participation, the latter are treated as
something aside from that. In this formalized approach, emphasis is placed on the source and
pedigree of power rather than its effects and consequences. In a world of such enormous
corporate power and influence, such a disciplinary device is almost guaranteed to ignore and
even condone extensive abuses of power. It guts the whole emancipatory dynamic of
accountability and makes democracy safe for the private exercise of corporate power. In short,
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large corporations are the favored offspring of neo-liberalism’s attachment to the publicprivate distinction.49

B. BEYOND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
Yet, when viewed from a thoroughly democratic perspective, the operations and decisionmaking of the modern corporation cannot be immune from public oversight in the public
interest. It is the ‘abuse of power’ in substantive and real terms which is the focus of attention.
The formal source of power is secondary to its effects and deprivations. Reliance on a strict
public-private distinction exacerbates the pernicious effects of privatized corporate power on
people’s lives. Of course, it does not follow that, when understood as “the dominant institution
of the modern world” (313), corporations are to be treated in the same way as other large-scale
public institutions by having the full panoply of duties and responsibilities under the
administrative or even constitutional law regime imposed on them by the courts. This is to
misunderstand both the nuanced and pluralistic insights of democratic governance and the
structural and democratic limitations of judicial review. Although it is important to appreciate
large corporations as remote and bureaucratic institutions and to emulate the participatory
ambitions of modern administrative law, it is both unwise and impractical to aggregate even
further power in the courts; their own democratic legitimacy is sufficiently fragile and
contested to caution against an extension of judicial review’s existing reach. 50 Instead, a
different and more substantive set of measures must be introduced which can grapple more
directly and effectively with the substantive and formal dimensions of what counts as ‘good
corporate governance’. If corporations can be made to function as a democratic nexus at
which public and private, political and economic, individual and state, and personal freedom
and civic responsibility meet, they will become less an anomaly in contemporary democratic
terms and more a primary site for the advancement of democratic politics.
At the heart of a democratic compact will be a re-invigoration of the neglected fact that the
corporate form is a distinctly public-created institution which is brought into existence by the
state and has certain conditional powers delegated to it by the state. As constructions and
emanations of the state, modern corporations have a distinctly public origin and a decidedly
public purpose.51 The debate about corporate governance is, therefore, about the nature and
parameters of those public purposes. Once corporations are understood in this way, it no
longer continues to be a question of whether it is appropriate or reasonable to ask corporate
owners and administrators to pursue the public interest at all. Instead, the more telling issue is
what public interests should the corporation pursue and how it should go about formulating
and operationalising them. The advancement of private interests will remain important, but
will not exhaust the ‘public interest’. By availing themselves of the advantages of
49
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incorporation, investors and entrepreneurs are entering into a bargain with the state and the
community -- in return for the benefits of pursuing their private ambitions through the
corporate form, people must accept the public responsibilities and costs that come with it.
Shareholders and stakeholders would become simply different kinds of members who would
include owners, directors, managers, workers, customers, suppliers, lenders, neighbours,
community, etc.

VII. A DEMOCRATIC AGENDA
There will be nothing easy about determining for the purposes of corporate governance which
groups are to classify as members, by what means their interests are to be ascertained, how to
ensure that those interests are adequately represented, and on what basis those often
competing interests are to be to weighed and balanced. However, a commitment to
democracy demands that such efforts be made. 52 While a variety of strategies lend themselves
to this emancipatory project, I will concentrate on four particular initiatives -- limits on limited
liability; a broadening of directors’ fiduciary duties; the increased representativeness of the
board; and the enactment of substantive regulatory standards. While each of these
innovations are not novel in themselves, they will, when taken together as a package, help to
bring about a genuine and thoroughgoing change in the democratic thrust of corporate
governance.

A. LIMITED LIABILITY
Although the limited liability of corporations is considered to be one of the main attractions of
incorporation as it encourages investment at less risk and with greater diversification, it has
some severe shortcomings -- it tends to re-allocate risk rather than reduce it; it places this reallocated risk on those stakeholders (e.g., employees, neighbours, etc.) often less able to
shoulder it; and it can encourage riskier behavior as corporations are excused from internalizing
the full costs of their risky behavior. 53 However, in order to make democratic sense of this
debate, it is necessary keep a broader and more encompassing view of corporate activity. After
all, as I have been at pains to emphasize, the whole notion of ‘governance’ implies much more
than simply doing profitable business; it suggests a public and accountable aspect to the
dealings of the corporation which encompasses, but is not only reducible to private gain and
52
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economic profitability. When understood from a democratic perspective, it is the limits of
limited liability rather than limited liability itself which must be re-configured.
Under such a democratic conception of corporate governance, it seems entirely unconvincing
to establish an institutional framework for legal liability which shifts almost all the costs onto
some persons and all the benefits onto different persons. At the moment, on the one hand,
there is management/shareholder control without responsibility and, on the other hand, there
is stakeholder responsibility without control. This is anathema to the democrat who is
committed to closing, not maintaining the gap between the powerful and the less powerful. If
people claim the rights of ownership and the authority to govern the corporation in their own
best interests, it seems almost axiomatic that they should at least bear some responsibility for
its actions and behavior. That being said, if the shareholder’s lack of responsibility is to
continue to any extent, then there seems no compelling reason to object to the reduced
control of shareholders or their displaced focus as the corporation’s main concern. From a
democratic perspective, the price of limited liability is the cost of reduced influence. While
there are also other legal mechanisms by which to reduce negative externalities created by
corporate conduct (i.e., general welfare laws designed to deter corporate conduct through
criminal and civil sanctions), the imposition of some liability in some circumstances on
shareholders seems democratically optimal.54
Rather than take an all-or-nothing stance, it is better to provide a series of initiatives that can
be combined to effect the limited and selective availability of limited liability. Possible legal
strategies for limiting limited liability include narrowing its scope to contractual risk as opposed
to tort liability, introducing pro rata liability for shareholders, 55 lifting the corporate veil more,
imposing selective liability on controlling shareholders, abolishing limited liability for
shareholding corporations, and greater vicarious liability of directors in certain circumstances.56
Each has the distinct potential to effect a more acceptable balance of control and risk; traces of
each approach can already be detected in corporate law. But, when understand as part of an
integrated and democratic approach to corporate governance, they can work together to
provide a more subtle, balanced and measured solution.
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The next step in transforming the modern corporation into a more democratic and more publicoriented institution is to take seriously the assertion that the board of directors must exercise
their powers and fulfill their fiduciary duties ‘in the best interests of the corporation’. In
defining which interests best comprise the corporation, it will be necessary to take a more
expansive view than the limited focus on the interests of one set of stakeholders, namely the
shareholders. Such interests are entirely deserving of consideration, but they will be only one
set of interests to be taken into the balance and not the exclusive or primary ones. The ghost
of Dodge must be exorcized once and for all. 57 The corporation is an organic entity with
multiple and shifting constituents whose interest will vary over time and in different contexts;
no one set of interests will have their thumb on the governance scales. In advancing the
welfare of the corporation, it will be important to assess the directors’ performance over an
extended time-frame rather than on a single decision basis; the best interests of the
corporation will not be reducible to a simple formula or set of fixed interest. This will be a
challenging undertaking for directors and one that will demand a variety of skills and
sensitivities. Traditional critics will be right to point out that such general obligations will not
easily be rendered operational, instilled with specific substance or given effective teeth; this
broad responsibility can become a shield to justify any action by the board. As Berle himself
observed, “unchecked by present legal balances, a social-economic absolutism of corporate
administrators, even if benevolent, might be unsafe.” 58 These are reasonable objections, but
insufficiently compelling to derail the whole project.
As things presently stand, the directors must often balance the competing interests of different
shareholders in a constantly shifting market -- Are long-, medium- or short-term interests of the
shareholders to be served? Are directors to concentrate on increasing production and
dividends or managing the share price? How is equity to be ensured among majority and
minority interests? These are far from easy questions and require considerable sophisticated
judgment on the part of the directors. Of course, extending the directors’ fiduciary duty to
stakeholders will not lessen that challenge. But it will not move it into a qualitatively different
realm of operational difficulty. There are already several fiduciary relationships imposed by law
(e.g., executors) which encompass duties to a class of persons or groups whose interests might
well be far from unitary or readily compatible. Consequently, while demanding and difficult,
the application of a broader fiduciary duty is certainly not outside the competence of
sophisticated businesspersons. Rather than be an exceptional duty, the fiduciary responsibility
of directors would be brought in line with the thematic principle that fiduciaries are to be held
“to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace; ... only thus has the level of conduct
57
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for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.” 59 In the campaign
to democratize the corporation, this seems an essential and welcome reform.

C. REPRESENTATIVE BOARDS
Corporate duties to stakeholders are an improvement, but they are not a lasting or substantial
solution and their effects will be muted. Unless there is a change in the composition of those
entrusted with the power and responsibility to run the corporation, it will always be what
managers or shareholder-appointed directors think is in the best interests of the broader
stakeholder community rather than stakeholders being able to determine that for themselves.
After all, democracy is not only supposed to be for the people, but of the people. No matter
how benign or progressive the decisions made by elite groups may be, they remain decisions
which lack the important imprimatur of democratic participation: accountability is only a poor
second to participation as a mode of democratic governance. As with other institutions and
agencies charged with advancing the public interest, there is a compelling need for public
participation. Accordingly, as well as reforming the rules for proxy voting, strenuous efforts
must be made to introduce reforms which will facilitate involvement by those stakeholder
groups whose interests are directly and substantially at stake in corporate behavior.
However, because the potential effects of large-scale corporate activities are truly wide-ranging
and often global, this challenge is beset by practical difficulties. The two main initiatives to date
for dealing with this conundrum are ‘diversified shareholding’ and ‘independent directors’.
While they both make important in-roads into present arrangements, they fall short of any truly
democratic goal. Whereas ‘independent directors’ are themselves appointed by and are often
beholden to the existing shareholder-appointed board, ‘diversified shareholding’ tends to
reinforce the existing scheme of corporate governance by perpetuating the idea that financial
contribution is the best measure of democratic participation.60 When employees become
shareholders, the real threat is that they become persuaded to adopt the same purely
economic mentality to corporate planning and success as today’s shareholders; they will be
more interested in short-term gains in the secondary stock market than in long-term
contributions to the primary goods-and-services and jobs market.
A more convincing avenue of democratic reform would be to introduce independence and
diversification in a more direct manner. For instance, it might be possible to divided affected
persons and stakeholders into three main constituencies. Each constituency would represent
and give increased involvement to different members of the corporate community. The three
constituencies would be the shareholders, the employees, and the other stakeholders or the
public. As regards the shareholder constituency, all shareholders might have the same
59
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entitlements and responsibilities with no one shareholder being able to exercise more than 25%
of the overall total of votes available to shareholders. When it came to the employees, all
existing and permanent employees, part-time and full-time as well as management and rankand-file, would be eligible to vote for a third of the board: those who stood for election as
employee-representatives would themselves have to be employees. Finally, as regards the
public constituency (which would include all other stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers,
customers, local community, etc.), there might be an attempt to designate a third of the board
as ‘general public directors’ whose mandate would be to represent the public interest as it
applies to the operations of a particular corporation. These directors could be selected by a
2/3rds vote of the rest of the already-elected board of shareholder- and employeerepresentatives from a list of approved candidates maintained by a public agency which would
have ultimate authority to approve or disapprove such elected persons as being suitably diverse
and pertinent to the specific corporation’s operations.61 In order to be admitted to this list,
candidates would have to satisfy the regulatory body that they not only had general directorial
competence, but that they also appreciated the public role and democratic responsibilities of
corporations.
By establishing such a balanced scheme of membership, certain important advantages will
accrue. Apart from the general conformity of the proposal to a democratic vision of corporate
governance, the most obvious benefits are twofold. First, even if individual directors take a
very self-regarding stance by pushing only for the interests of those groups who elected them,
they will still have to persuade others of the more general wisdom of that stance. It will likely
require a more long-term approach to directorial debate so that priorities and plans will be able
to proceed on a more consensual basis. Also, being exposed to different perspectives might
well loosen the more parochial concerns of particular directors. Moreover, the active presence
of the ‘public directors’ will oblige other directors to develop and frame their views in ways
which are more conducive to the promotion of the general public interest. Secondly, because
the board of directors would be under a broad fiduciary duty to advance the interests of the
whole corporation, the considerable challenge of balancing competing interests and objectives
might be more easily accomplished. By having a more diverse and representative board, an
appreciation of what is in the best interests of the corporation as a whole will be more
informed and immediate: the various stakeholder communities will have a direct voice in
discussions. This will also help to de-stabilize the ruling elite which presently has a virtual lock
on corporate decision-making and culture. Accordingly, the odds on making the democratic
wager are significantly shortened by the appointment of a more diverse and representative
board of directors.62
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Nevertheless, while such reforms in representation will be extremely important, they again will
not be sufficient in themselves to implement a democratic system of corporate governance.
The introduction of more stakeholder-representative boards, greater responsibility for
corporate actors and beneficiaries, and better protections for minority shareholders will be
vitally important. But they will not be enough. If the goal is to ensure that large corporations
act in a more democratically and responsive manner, it will also be essential to lay down certain
minimum substantive standards against which corporate performance and behaviour can be
judged. Accordingly, there will need to be a mix-and-match balance between structural reform
and substantive regulation. As traditional scholars insist, it is naive to believe that asking
present corporate officers to act responsibly for the benefit of stakeholder communities will be
sufficient or that making structural changes without some accompanying ethical shift will
achieve a marked degree of democratic modification. 63 In order for there to be genuine change
and transformation in corporate behaviour, it will be necessary for society as a whole to
participate in the continuing responsibility of determining what is ‘in the public interest’. As
public institutions and government-created ones at that, corporations must at a minimum be
obliged to ensure that they do not act in a way that is inimical to the public interest. As things
presently stand, the ‘public interest’ is too often a by-product of what happens to advance
corporate and private interests at any given time and place. In a democracy, it is for the public
through democratic institutions and processes to determine what that public interest is; it is
not for corporations either by design or default to appropriate that task entirely for themselves
alone.
As well as improved transparency in corporate transactions and dealings, it would also be
necessary to introduce mandatory disclosure and reporting on a whole range of economic and
social issues that might include, for example, information on the products a company produces
and the countries in which it does business; on the corporation’s law compliance structure; on
its domestic labour practices; on its global labour practices and supplier/vendor standards; on
its domestic and global environmental effects; on corporate charitable contributions, political
contributions, or the effects of using a corporation’s products on consumer health and safety. 64
law that there is to be worker representation on the supervisory boards of large public corporations. While the
impact of this innovation should not be exaggerated, it has not brought German capitalism to its knees. Indeed,
some might argue that it has been a contributing factor in the relative success of German industry. See Peter
Cornelius and Bruce Kogut, Creating the Responsible Firm: In Search for A New Corporate Governance Paradigm, 4
GERMAN L. J. 45 (2003). Moreover, the fact that such arrangements are now being dismantled does not speak to
their democratic desirability or efficacy: it does speak to the globalizing pressure of a shareholder-centric
approach.
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However, if corporate governance is to be taken seriously on its own terms, the enactment and
enforcement of such regulations must not be left only to securities regulators. While the
protection of shareholder interests is a necessary feature of any advanced economy, it is not
and should not be the only game in town. Of course, it is not surprising that the authorities
persist in treating corporate governance as largely about the protection of shareholders
interests alone when the informing vision of corporate governance is so shareholder-centred in
orientation, content and enforcement. Accordingly, under a democratic model of corporate
governance, it will be essential to create and empower a public regulatory body whose
exclusive responsibility is to deal squarely with corporate governance in its own right and not
only as a function of the protection of shareholder interests. Because the size and power of
large modern corporations has assumed such significance, it is clear that they warrant their
own regulatory body.

E. DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM
Finally, in offering this robust critique of contemporary approaches to corporate law and
governance, it bears emphasizing that my intention has not been to defend the claim that
productivity or profit-making is a bad thing. Nor am I recommending that all jobs will be
forever safe or that the workers’ and other stakeholders’ interests will always outweigh those
of shareholders. This would be plain silly. There is nothing wrong with productivity, efficiency,
profitability, etc. Indeed, they are essential values for any modern society to embrace and
foster. But it is the elevation of such values to a cluster of meta-values against which all social
processes and other values must be judged that is the problem. As both a matter of historical
record and as an issue of public policy, it is mistaken to suggest shareholder-value maximization
is or ought to be the sole or primary goal of the business corporation. This would be, as an
incredulous critic notes, “to define the business corporation ... as a kind of shark that lives off
the community rather than as an important agency in the construction, maintenance, and
transformation of our shared lives.” 65 In particular, there is no sense in thinking about large
corporations as a democratic venue for democratic engagement between political equals.
While a cost-benefit analysis is necessary and desirable, it ought to be the first step in making
any corporate decision, not the first, last and only consideration. The process of formulating
benefits and entitlements is important in itself under a democratic theory; an appreciation of
the social context within which individuals exist and thrive is essential.
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There is simply no reason to be persuaded that capitalism and democracy are somehow
synonymous.66 Indeed, the link between capitalism and democracy is weak at best and
counter-productive at worst. If capitalism is to remain, then it must serve rather than master
the interests of democracy. Citizens are entitled to basic economic protections by virtue of
their membership in society and not only through their efforts at contractual negotiations.
Democrats appreciate that, while everything has a cost, that is not the sole measure of value:
citizens are not only consumers. And Democracy is not only or best sold in the marketplace.
Indeed, as Amy Chua has noted, “markets concentrate wealth, often spectacular wealth, in the
hands of the market-dominant minority, while democracy increases the political power of the
impoverished majority.” 67 The obvious challenge is to ensure that politics is played out
throughout social life and not merely confined to areas outside the economic sphere; people
are entitled to participation and accountability in their dealings with and inside businesses as
much as with politicians and governments. Accordingly, a shift to more democraticallystructured corporations will likely galvanize the democratic instinct generally. As President
Woodrow Wilson famously opined, “the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy, not
less.”

VIII. CONCLUSION
Recent events in corporate governance have at least opened up a space to think seriously about
how it might be possible to turn the present system’s failings to transformative effect. Indeed,
with effort and imagination, it might presently be possible to bring to an end the age of the
corporation as a private-controlled agency for wealth accumulation. Uncoupled from ‘market
capitalism’ and hitched to a more democratic vision, the institution of the corporation can
become a social, political and economic organization in which public, political and distributive
ends are in play as well as private, economic and productive ones. Berle and Means’ The
Modern Corporation has a definite contribution to make to that project provided that its
traditional reading is abandoned and its more enlightened alternative theme is emphasized;
there must be a shift from ‘private property’ to ‘democratic accountability’ such that public
policy is not only consistent with private cupidity. When large corporations are understood and
analyzed in the larger setting of democracy, it will be possible to move forward. By carrying out
such a democratic stock-taking, it might then be possible to provide a more telling critique of
corporate governance and to offer more constructive proposals for change. Indeed, it is only
when corporations are obliged to become part of, rather than remain apart from, democratic
society more broadly that progress will be made.

66

For a sophisticated attempt to portray ‘market economics’ as an (American) article of faith, see ROBERT NELSON,
ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSON TO CHICAGO AND BEYOND (2001). See also G. SOROS, OPEN
SOCIETY: REFORMING GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2000) and JOHN KAY, THE TRUTH ABOUT MARKETS: THEIR GENIUS,
THEIR LIMITS, THEIR FOIBLES (2003).

67

A. CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL
INSTABILITY ** (2003).

36

OSGOODE CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 07 NO. 04

But the present conditions of decay and deterioration will only last for short time. Any window
of opportunity is already closing fast: the old habits and entrenched arrangements are
beginning to re-assert themselves. In the meantime, it is essential that those who take the
democratic imperative seriously act quickly and decisively; the opportunity might not come
again or soon. A belated seventy-fifth anniversary of Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means’
The Modern Corporation and Private Property could be celebrated in no more fitting or timely
way than with such a initiative. Indeed, it might well be that, as goes corporate governance, so
goes democracy.

